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THE CRADLE OF THE 
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY 
REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS 
OF CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE 
PRESENT. By Keith E. Whittington.1 University Press of 
Kansas. 2019. Pp. xxi + 410. $39.95 (Cloth). 
John W. Compton2 
Political scientists and law professors have been debating 
over the normative implications of judicial review for the better 
part of six decades. The contours of the discussion took shape in 
the early 1960s, following the publication of Alexander Bickel’s 
The Least Dangerous Branch.3 Bickel’s book launched a still-
vibrant critical tradition that characterizes judicial review as an 
anomalous, “countermajoritarian force” in the American 
constitutional system.4 On this view, the courts’ power to 
invalidate democratically enacted statutes gives rise to a 
normative conundrum that is not easily resolved: How can “the 
people” be said to rule if their preferred policies—or those 
enacted by their representatives—are subject to veto by an 
unelected and unaccountable judiciary? 
At roughly the same time that Bickel was formulating what 
came to be known as “the countermajoritarian difficulty,” the 
political scientist Robert Dahl proposed a remarkably simple 
answer to Bickel’s puzzle: So long as federal judges were 
appointed and confirmed by politicians affiliated with a durable 
partisan regime, there was little reason to fear that the judiciary’s 
constitutional vision would, for any significant length of time, be 
at odds with the policy views of electoral majorities.5 The 
 
 1. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University.  
 2. Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, Chapman 
University.  
 3. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
 4. Id. at 16. 
 5. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as 
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possibility of unelected judges thwarting the will of the people 
might be troubling in theory, but in practice it was likely to occur 
only rarely—for example, in the interim between the rise of a new 
dominant party coalition and the departure of the old regime’s 
judges. 
Both Bickel and Dahl’s accounts have come in for serious 
criticism in recent years, but they continue to define the terms of 
the debate—at least for the moment. In his provocative new book, 
Repugnant Laws, Keith Whittington argues that both perspectives 
are marred by flawed understandings of the political dynamics 
surrounding judicial review, and that scholars would be well 
advised to move beyond them. This is an audacious claim, but it 
gains credibility from a remarkable new dataset, compiled by 
Whittington himself, consisting of every case in which the 
Supreme Court has reviewed the constitutionality of a federal 
statute, either in whole or in part. The end result is perhaps the 
most comprehensive guide to the actual practice of judicial review 
ever produced. Seen in its entirety, Whittington argues, the record 
of the Court’s interactions with Congress suggests that Dahl’s 
framework is useful but overly simplistic, while Bickel’s is so 
divorced from reality as to be of little use at all (pp. 6, 9, 301–302). 
On the first point, Whittington is entirely persuasive. Indeed, 
the evidence presented in Repugnant Laws should lay to rest, 
once and for all, the conception of the Supreme Court as the 
handmaiden of political parties. Relying on a combination of data 
analysis and narrative treatments of important Court decisions, 
Whittington shows that the Court has been neither as friendly to 
the dominant party nor as hostile to the out-of-power party as 
Dahl led his readers to expect. Although constitutional 
jurisprudence has undoubtedly evolved in tandem with changes in 
the party system, Whittington concludes that “[t]he justices are 
not lapdogs, and they have often bitten the hand of the party that 
placed them on the bench” (p. 291). 
But if Whittington succeeds in debunking, or at least 
seriously modifying, Dahl’s framework, his attempt to sketch an 
alternative resolution to the countermajoritarian dilemma is less 
convincing. The problem, in short, is that a dataset documenting 
the history of the Court’s interactions with Congress is a better 
instrument for testing Dahl’s relatively specific empirical 
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predictions than for evaluating Bickel’s more sweeping, 
fundamentally normative concerns. As I argue below, the lack of 
fit between Whittington’s methodology and his normative 
defense of judicial review is on full display in his chapters on the 
Lochner era—an era he aptly describes as “the cradle of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty” (p. 173). Knowing that the phrase 
“Lochner Court” has long served as shorthand for “judicial 
overreach,” he sets out to show that the early-twentieth-century 
Court was neither as inflexible nor as anti-democratic as its many 
critics, including Bickel, have alleged. But the results are 
ultimately unpersuasive. Aside from demonstrating that the 
Court invalidated federal laws at a lower rate than conventional 
wisdom might lead one to expect, Repugnant Laws does little to 
absolve the Lochner Court of the charges of unpredictability and 
unprincipled decision-making that initially earned it the 
opprobrium of legal scholars and historians. 
I. 
Conventional accounts of the Lochner era—roughly 
speaking, the period between the mid-1890s and the New Deal—
describe an all-or-nothing struggle between popular majorities 
determined to mitigate the human cost of industrialization and a 
judiciary bent on protecting corporations and the wealthy from 
the democratic mob. In recent years, however, this familiar 
narrative has come under increasing scrutiny from scholars 
determined to rehabilitate the Lochner Court’s image.6 
Repugnant Laws, which devotes the better part of two lengthy 
chapters to this period, clearly belongs in the revisionist camp. Yet 
Whittington’s aims are somewhat different than those of other 
recent revisionists. Instead of attempting to revive specific 
doctrines (such as dual federalism and economic due process) that 
flourished during the Lochner era, he challenges the broader 
characterization of the early twentieth-century Court as an 
erratic, unprincipled, and generally destabilizing force in the 
 
 6. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2012); BARRY M. CUSHMAN, 
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION (1998); 8 OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910 (1993); 
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993). 
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constitutional order. Seen in their entirety, he argues, the Lochner 
Court’s interactions with Congress reveal a tribunal that steered 
a cautious middle course between upholding inherited 
constitutional commitments and accommodating the political 
demands of the present—a tribunal that salvaged what it could of 
nineteenth-century constitutional norms, but “rarely, if ever” at 
the expense of alienating “a clear majority of elected officials” (p. 
148). 
Whittington begins his defense of the Lochner Court by 
marshaling an array of quantitative evidence to show that the 
Court was more accommodating of Progressive legislative 
reforms than is usually believed. Prior to William Howard Taft’s 
appointment as Chief Justice in 1921, he points out, the rate at 
which the Court invalidated federal laws was only slightly higher 
than in earlier historical periods (when taking into account 
Congress’s increased statutory output), and many invalidated 
provisions were so insignificant as to make little impression on 
either Congress or the public (pp. 146–150). This is an important 
insight, and one that seems incontestable based on the evidence 
presented here. Yet Whittington’s claims grow more tendentious 
as he moves from discussing the relative frequency of judicial 
invalidations to discussing these decisions’ broader implications 
for constitutional theory. His larger argument, it soon becomes 
clear, is that even the Lochner Court’s most notorious rulings—
those that struck down important federal laws, and for reasons 
contemporaries found difficult to square with received doctrine—
have been wrongly characterized as countermajoritarian. 
Put more concretely, Whittington’s thesis is that the Lochner 
Court reserved its landmark invalidations for cases where: (1) the 
law in question was widely viewed as constitutionally flawed; and 
(2) the sponsoring party was itself internally divided about either 
the wisdom or constitutionality of the statute (p. 151). Hence, 
while decisions striking down federal child labor or minimum 
wage laws may have come as a shock to left-leaning 
contemporaries, they were fully in keeping with the spirit of 
principled pragmatism that governed the Court’s decision-making 
in this period. Believing that the challenged laws transgressed 
clear constitutional boundaries and that they lacked the support 
of mobilized partisan majorities, the justices took the opportunity 
to shore up threatened constitutional boundaries where they 
could. And—crucially—this was not a solo effort. Rather, the 
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Lochner-era justices “worked hand in hand with the conservative 
political leaders in both parties to realize a common constitutional 
vision of limited government within a decentralized federal 
system” (p. 148). 
If the Lochner Court was motivated by coherent 
constitutional commitments and attentive to the contemporary 
political environment, then one would be hard pressed to deny 
Whittington’s conclusion that the “countermajoritarian 
framework provides little leverage for evaluating the normative 
foundations of judicial review during [the Lochner] period” (p. 
173). But does his account of Lochner-era judicial decision-
making square with the historical record? To answer the question, 
we must look more closely at the circumstances surrounding 
Whittington’s list of important federal measures felled by judicial 
review. 
Whittington observes that the Fuller and White Courts 
handed down five decisions invalidating or limiting federal laws 
that were of great interest to contemporary voters and politicians: 
Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust I & II (1895),7 U.S. v. E.C. 
Knight Co. (1895),8 Employers’ Liability Cases (1908),9 and 
Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)10 (pp. 164–165). (Several other 
controversial decisions invalidating federal laws, including Adair 
v. U.S. (1908),11 are relegated to a section on “less important 
measures” (pp. 164–165).) He discusses each of these cases at 
some length, and in each case concludes that the invalidated 
provision was both constitutionally suspect (in the view of 
prominent contemporary commentators) and opposed by a 
significant faction of the enacting party. The Populist-inspired 
income tax provisions invalidated in Pollock, for example, were 
initially denounced (on both constitutional and policy grounds) 
by Conservative Northeasterners from both parties, including 
President Grover Cleveland. When the Court invalidated them, it 
was not defying the clearly expressed will of an electoral majority, 
but rather reining in a regionally powerful movement (Populism) 
whose central aims were of dubious constitutionality (pp. 158–
 
 7. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. Farmers’ 
Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
 8. United States v. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
 9. Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908). 
 10. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 11. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
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160). 
Aside from the reversal of the regional dynamics, the story 
was much the same in Hammer v. Dagenhart. Many prominent 
commentators, including President Woodrow Wilson, 
condemned proposals for a federal child labor law as 
unconstitutional (though Wilson eventually reversed his 
position), while Southern manufacturers viewed them as 
handouts to their Northeastern competitors (who faced higher 
production costs as a result of state child labor bans). Whittington 
thus concludes that Hammer, like Pollock, merely blocked a 
politically divisive constitutional experiment; it did not defy the 
clearly expressed will of the American people (pp. 160–161, 181–
182). 
Moving on to the Taft Court, Whittington acknowledges that 
the Court began invalidating federal laws at a faster clip in the 
1920s, yet he insists that most of the invalidated measures were 
politically insignificant. Indeed, only two Taft Court decisions “fit 
neatly” into the familiar narrative of a Court committed to 
blocking broadly popular Progressive economic reforms (p. 181). 
The first, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (1922),12 barred Congress 
from using its taxing power to restrict child labor; the second, 
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923),13 invalidated a federal 
minimum wage law for women and children in the District of 
Columbia. Even in these cases, however, Whittington contends 
that the countermajoritarian narrative conceals crucial aspects of 
the story. He notes that the child labor tax, like the earlier child 
labor law, was of greater interest to “New England 
manufactur[ers]” than to the general public, and both it and the 
D.C. minimum wage law were widely regarded as constitutionally 
suspect (p. 182). No less than the White and Fuller Courts, then, 
the Taft Court seems to have shied away from dramatic 
confrontations with Congress, acting to curb the growing 
regulatory state only in cases where the odds of a sustained 
political backlash were remote. 
Taken individually, these historical claims are undoubtedly 
valid, but it is far from clear that their collective effect is to fatally 
undermine the traditional understanding of the Lochner Court as 
a fickle and ultimately unprincipled tribunal. One reason for 
 
 12. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922). 
 13. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
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skepticism is that Whittington’s analysis suffers from what might 
be called, for lack of a better label, a “selecting on the dependent 
variable” problem. He spends a great deal of time explaining why 
apparently countermajoritarian decisions invalidating federal 
laws were either not really at odds with majority sentiment, or else 
why the reforms in question were so obviously unconstitutional 
(according to prevailing theories of constitutional interpretation) 
that their sponsors should have expected to lose in court. 
Meanwhile, decisions that upheld innovative federal regulations 
are discussed only in passing, or else summarized in tables (pp. 
166–171). 
The reader is therefore left with a number of unanswered 
questions: Were the reforms that survived the judicial gauntlet 
less controversial from the standpoint of constitutional theory 
than those that did not? Were they more likely to enjoy the 
backing of mobilized electoral majorities or unified political 
parties? Absent a serious effort to draw comparisons across cases 
invalidating and upholding major reforms, it is hard to know 
whether contemporaneous observers were really so misguided in 
thinking that the Lochner-era justices were neither principled nor 
pragmatic in their interactions with Congress. 
II. 
To be fair, Whittington’s aim in these chapters is not so much 
to propose a comprehensive, predictive theory of judicial review 
as it is to poke holes in some crucial, but rarely examined, 
assumptions of the countermajoritarian framework. Moreover, an 
in-depth discussion of the political and doctrinal contexts of every 
federal measure reviewed by the early twentieth-century Court 
would have caused an already-long book to balloon into a 
multivolume work. Still, it is worth thinking briefly about what 
this type of analysis might have revealed. 
Were the two federal child labor laws, for example, so 
obviously at odds with accepted federalism principles that their 
supporters should have predicted their demise? Whittington 
points out, correctly, that a number of commentators, including 
President Wilson, expressed doubts about the constitutionality of 
a federal child labor ban (p. 160).14 At least in Wilson’s case, 
 
 14. Whittington cites WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 177–178, 179, 187 (1908). 
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however, the remarks in question predated a slew of Court 
decisions that expanded Congress’s interstate commerce power 
far beyond its nineteenth-century limits. In particular, the Court’s 
1913 decision upholding the Mann Act—which banned the 
interstate transportation of women for “immoral” purposes—
convinced many skeptics (including, apparently, Wilson) that the 
commerce power could now reach any person or item that moved 
across state lines.15 Such predictions turned out to be mistaken, as 
a bare majority of the Court held in Hammer that this power did 
not extend to products that were “of themselves . . . harmless.”16 
But the larger question is why a group of justices motivated by a 
principled commitment to dual federalism did not invalidate 
earlier reforms, such as the Mann Act and the 1895 federal anti-
lottery law, that provoked equally loud howls of protest from legal 
commentators.17 If Whittington is right that the Court saw itself as 
the conscience of the Republican regime—pointing lawmakers 
back to the party’s founding principles when those principles were 
temporarily jettisoned in the interest of partisan advantage—then 
it should have acted decisively to rein in Congress’s commerce 
power long before 1918. Its failure to do so created an 
environment in which decisions such as Hammer, which 
attempted to reassert the old boundaries, were almost certain to 
be viewed as little more than fits of judicial pique.18 
Of course, Whittington’s claim is not that the Lochner 
Court’s decisions were uniformly principled. Rather, it is that the 
Court acted on principle when political circumstances permitted, 
reserving its principled stands for cases where the challenged 
policy was of little interest to the public, or where the sponsoring 
party was itself divided (pp. 172–173). But is it true that the 
Lochner Court studiously avoided antagonizing “mobilized 
political majorit[ies],” advancing its constitutional commitments 
 
 15. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL AND 
BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910–21, VOL. 9 231–232 (1971). 
 16. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918). 
 17. GAINES M. FOSTER, MORAL RECONSTRUCTION: CHRISTIAN LOBBYISTS AND 
THE FEDERAL LEGISLATION OF MORALITY, 1865–1920, 144–145 (2002); JESSICA R. 
PLILEY, POLICING SEXUALITY: THE MANN ACT AND THE MAKING OF THE FBI 67–75 
(2014); Thomas M. Cooley, Taxation of Lotteries, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 69, Apr. 1892 at 
523–534 (describing the constitutionally dubious nature of Congress’s attempts to reach 
the lottery industry via its enumerated powers). 
 18. John W. Compton, Easing the Show Where It Pinches: The Lottery Case and the 
Demise of Dual Federalism, 40 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 133, 139–149 (2015). 
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only “within the band of indifference established by other 
political actors” (pp. 172, 9)? 
Again, the two child labor decisions would seem to contradict 
this claim, given that the anti-child labor movement, at its height, 
was among the most potent reform movements in American 
history. By the time of the Hammer decision, most non-Southern 
states (as well as several Southern ones) had already banned child 
labor, some via popular referenda that passed by overwhelming 
margins.19 And although Southern manufacturers and a small 
coterie of allied politicians continued to oppose federal child 
labor laws, it is a stretch to say that the issue was a major cause of 
schism within either party.20 By the time the Owen-Keating Act 
was signed into law in 1916, both major parties had incorporated 
support for a federal child labor ban into their platforms (as had 
the Progressives).21 Six years later, when the Bailey decision made 
clear that the Court would never permit Congress to reach child 
labor via its enumerated powers, virtually the whole of American 
civil society—including the nation’s largest membership groups 
and religious denominations—lined up in support of a 
constitutional amendment that would have overridden the 
Court’s decision.22 
Whittington acknowledges most of these facts, but concludes 
that the Court could safely block federal child labor laws because 
the “political costs” to current presidential administrations were 
minimal (pp. 172–173). It is hard to know what to make of this 
claim. When a proposed reform enjoys reasonably strong support 
from both political parties, it is true that voters are unlikely to 
punish the President’s party for an adverse Court decision. But 
this insight makes the Court’s decision not to block earlier 
expansions of Congress’s enumerated powers—many of which 
enjoyed similarly strong bipartisan backing—all the more 
 
 19. Julie Novkov, Historicizing the Figure of the Child in Legal Discourse: The Battle 
over the Regulation of Child Labor, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 369, 373 (2000); Child Labor 
Bill: Hearings before the Committee on Labor, House of Representatives, H.R. 8234, 64th 
Cong. (1916). 
 20. JOHN A. FLITER, CHILD LABOR IN AMERICA: THE EPIC LEGAL STRUGGLE TO 
PROTECT CHILDREN 84–85, 87 (2018) (noting that most of the bill’s opponents were 
“connected in some way to the Southern textile mills,” and that, in the Senate, the only 
‘no’ votes came from ten Southern Senators, plus two Senators from Pennsylvania, ‘a state 
with one of the highest rates of child labor’.”). 
 21. Id. at 81. 
 22. MOLLY LADD-TAYLOR, MOTHER-WORK: WOMEN, CHILD WELFARE, AND THE 
STATE, 1890–1930 96 (1994). 
35.1 COMPTON 6/19/2020  11:57 AM 
74 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 35:65 
 
puzzling. 
Moreover, from the perspective of the justices, the more 
pressing concern in cases invalidating broadly popular laws would 
seem to be how such decisions impact popular and elite 
perceptions of the Court, not how they affect the fortunes of the 
political parties. And in the case of the child labor decisions, the 
damage to the Court’s prestige was significant. Not only did 
Congress quickly authorize a constitutional amendment 
overturning the Court’s decisions (which was ratified by twenty-
eight states before the New Deal-era constitutional revolution 
made it irrelevant), but—more to the point—Hammer and Drexel 
spawned an outpouring of academic and popular commentary 
alleging that the Court’s federalism jurisprudence had become so 
convoluted that it could only be regarded as a smokescreen for 
the interests of big business.23 No doubt the Court’s critics would 
have advanced such arguments even in the absence of the child 
labor decisions, but the tortuous logic of Justice Day’s Hammer 
opinion—which gamely attempted to square the Court’s suddenly 
narrow view of the commerce power with a host of seemingly 
incompatible precedents—made their task easier.24 
The case for a cautiously principled Lochner Court becomes 
even less compelling when one considers the many instances in 
which the justices missed what in retrospect appear obvious 
opportunities to reinforce threatened constitutional boundaries 
by taking advantage of partisan fissures or public indifference. A 
prime example is McCray v. U.S.,25 the 1904 decision that 
effectively transformed Congress’s taxing power from a means of 
revenue generation to a broader regulatory tool capable of 
reaching subjects that were traditionally classified under the 
states’ police powers. The case centered on a federal 
oleomargarine tax, adopted in 1902, that was designed to shield 
politically connected dairy producers from unwanted 
competition. The brainchild of Republican lawmakers from New 
England (whose states produced the bulk of the nation’s butter), 
the tax drew stiff opposition from Southern Democrats, and also 
 
 23. Cf. Compton, supra note 18, at 146–148. 
 24. Cf. Thurlow M. Gordon, The Child Labor Law Case, 32 HARV. L. REV. 45 (1918); 
William Carey Jones, The Child Labor Decision, 6 CAL. L. REV. 395 (1918); Thomas Reed 
Powell, The Child Labor Law, the Tenth Amendment, and the Commerce Clause, 3. S. L. 
Q. 175 (1918). 
 25. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904). 
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from a significant faction of Republicans who were either 
connected to the oleomargarine industry or whose constituents 
resented being asked to subsidize New England dairy producers. 
Dozens of prominent Republicans, including the chair of the 
relevant House committee, denounced the tax as 
unconstitutional.26 Other party stalwarts, like Senator George 
Frisbee Hoar, reluctantly supported it while warning that such an 
obvious attempt to “usurp” the states’ police powers was unlikely 
to survive judicial review.27 When the measure emerged from 
committee, it sparked substantial opposition in the full House and 
Senate, in the latter case barely surviving a motion to recommit.28 
Given the fractured state of the parties and the lack of a 
supportive popular majority, the Court had little reason to fear 
that a decision reasserting a narrow interpretation of the taxing 
power would provoke a political backlash. It is therefore 
surprising—at least from the perspective of Whittington’s 
framework—that the Court endorsed the measure’s 
constitutionality in a 6–3 decision. 
Nor was McCray the only missed opportunity. A similar 
situation arose in 1913, when Congress, under pressure from 
prohibitionists, made it a federal offense to ship liquor across state 
lines with the intent of violating state law. Although the Webb-
Kenyon Act passed a Democratic-controlled House and a 
Republican-controlled Senate by comfortable margins, it sparked 
intense opposition from constitutional Conservatives in the 
Republican party, including President William Howard Taft and 
Attorney General George Wickersham, who argued that the law 
unconstitutionally delegated Congress’s commerce power to the 
states, while also violating a longstanding norm mandating 
uniformity in interstate commerce regulations. Taft ultimately 
vetoed the measure, using his message to accuse Congress of 
unilaterally “amend[ing]” the Commerce Clause.29 Congress then 
overrode the veto, at which point the debate shifted to the courts. 
Given that a Republican President well-versed in constitutional 
questions had expressed deep reservations about the law, one 
might expect a Court featuring seven Republican appointees (and 
 
 26. Herbert F. Marguiles, Federal Police Power by Taxation: McCray v. United States 
and the Oleomargarine Tax of 1902, 5 J.S. LEGAL HIST. 1, 6 (1997). 
 27. Id. at 16. 
 28. Id. at 26. 
 29. FISS, supra note 6, at 287. 
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four Taft appointees) to react with similar skepticism. Instead, the 
Court handed down a 7–2 decision upholding the Webb-Kenyon 
Act in its entirety, with Justice White, whom Taft had elevated to 
the Chief Justiceship, penning a majority opinion whose doctrinal 
pirouettes provided still more fodder for the Court’s Progressive 
critics.30 
III. 
These examples call into question Whittington’s claim that 
the Lochner-era justices hewed to “the straight and narrow path 
of conservative constitutionalism,” wavering only in the face of 
intense political pressure (p. 151). More broadly, they cast doubt 
on his argument that the Lochner Court’s interactions with 
Congress were fundamentally predictable. In fact, as many 
contemporary observers pointed out, the defining feature of the 
Court’s output in this period was its unpredictability. When 
innovative federal laws appeared on the Court’s docket, no one 
could say with certainty whether the justices would enforce 
traditional constitutional limitations or acquiesce in the expansion 
of federal regulatory capacities. In several pivotal cases, 
essentially random occurrences, such as illnesses or recusals, 
tipped the balance.31 And even in cases unaffected by such factors, 
the lack of an ideological screening process for Court nominees 
yielded a combustible mix of incompatible judicial philosophies 
that made predicting outcomes all but impossible.32 It was this 
sense of constant doctrinal flux, as much as the antidemocratic 
 
 30. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917); Cf. 
Lindsay Rogers, Webb-Kenyon Decision, 4 VA. L. REV. 558 (1916–1917); Noel T. 
Downing, Divesting and Article of Its Interstate Character: An Examination of the Doctrine 
Underlying the Webb-Kenyon Act, 5 MINN. L. REV. 100 (1920–1921); Samuel P. Orth, 
Webb-Kenyon Law Decision, CORNELL L. Q. 283 (1916–1917). 
 31. Had Justice Gray not been forced from the bench by illness in 1902, the Court 
might well have struck down the 1895 federal lottery law, thus limiting the scope of the 
federal police power. Or had Justice Brandeis not recused himself in Stettler v. O’Hara, 
243 U.S. 629 (1917), the Court likely would have delivered a clear affirmation of a state 
minimum wage law in 1917, thus potentially leading to a different outcome in Adkins v. 
Children’s Hospital. 
 32. Consider that President Theodore Roosevelt nominated such ideological 
opposites as William Day (author of the majority opinion in Hammer) and Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. (whose dissent in the same case was a rallying cry for Progressives), while 
President Wilson nominated both James Clark McReynolds and Louis Brandeis. President 
William Howard Taft managed to select a more ideologically coherent cohort of justices, 
but the generally short tenures of his appointees blunted their impact on constitutional 
doctrine. 
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implications of the Court’s decisions, that formed the core of the 
Progressive case against judicial authority.33 
The importance of doctrinal stability was also a major, 
though often overlooked, theme of Bickel’s Least Dangerous 
Branch. The book’s argument that the Court should whenever 
possible use “passive devices” to avoid resolving abstract 
questions of constitutional authority was, to be sure, partly 
motivated by worries about the Court’s democratic legitimacy (or 
lack thereof).34 But it was also rooted in concerns about the 
unintended and often destabilizing effects of sweeping 
constitutional decisions like those that came to define the 
Lochner Era. Durable constitutional norms, Bickel argued, could 
only be articulated and sustained through an ongoing “colloquy” 
between the judiciary and the other branches of government.35 
When the Court closed off the interbranch conversation with 
grand, principled pronouncements, it was writing checks it could 
not cash; lacking the support of powerful political actors, the 
resulting norms would be fragile, if not altogether unenforceable; 
and their purported permanence and universality would leave the 
Court with no obvious means of retreat in the event that they 
proved unworkable, or were twisted to purposes not envisioned 
by their authors. For Bickel, judicial modesty was not only a 
means for maximizing democratic accountability; it was also a way 
of rendering the constitutional system more stable and 
predictable—and hence more “morally supportable.”36 
Repugnant Laws is a groundbreaking work, and the data on 
which it is based will prove invaluable to scholars of judicial 
politics. Whittington also deserves much credit for pointing the 
way toward a more nuanced understanding of the Supreme 
Court’s relationship to political parties and electoral coalitions. 
And yet, in the end, readers inclined to view strong-form judicial 
review as a deviant force in the constitutional system are unlikely 
to derive much comfort from his concluding observation that the 
Court has typically reserved its fire for statutes that were the 
 
 33. As Edward Corwin wrote in an article documenting the twists and turns of 
Commerce Clause doctrine in the 1910s and 1920s, conflicting precedents concerning the 
scope of Congress’s authority were so abundant that, depending on which “horse” the 
Court chose to “saddle,” it could push doctrine in any “direction it wishes to ride.” Edward 
S. Corwin, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES’ RIGHTS 167, 248–249 (1934). 
 34. BICKEL, supra, note 3, at 206. 
 35. Id. at 156. 
 36. Id. at 20. 
35.1 COMPTON 6/19/2020  11:57 AM 
78 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 35:65 
 
products of “legislative logrolling, special-interest rent seeking, 
legislative ineptitude, . . . or political grandstanding,” (pp. 301–
302). Pointing out that Congress, too, is capable of subverting the 
“will of the people” is not the same as explaining why Americans 
should celebrate an institution whose interventions in the 
policymaking process have, historically speaking, been both 
highly unpredictable and very difficult to reverse. Or, as Bickel 
put the point, “impurities and imperfections . . . in one part of the 
system are no argument for total departure from the desired norm 
in another part.”37 
 
 
 37. Id. 
